

**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF RICHMOND**

-----X **DCM PART 3**  
**In the Matter of the Application of**  
**ROSALIE CARDINALE,** **Petitioner,** **Present:**  
**Hon. Desmond Green, J.S.C.**  
**-against-** **DECISION AND ORDER**  
**THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF** **Index No. 85165/2017**  
**EDUCATION** **Respondent.** **Motion No. 3228-001**  
**4596-002**  
-----X

The following papers numbered 1 to 6 were marked fully submitted on February 21, 2018:

	Numbered
Notice of Petition and Verified Petition and Exhibits (dated August 9, 2017).....	1
Notice of Cross-Motion to Dismiss made by Respondent (dated November 8, 2017).....	2
Affidavit of Ms. Laura C. Williams (admission pending) in Support of Respondent’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss with Exhibits Attached (dated November 8, 2017) .....	3
Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss (dated November 8, 2017) .....	4
Combined Affidavit and Memorandum of Law in Opposition (dated November 29, 2017) .....	5
Reply Affidavit of Ms. Laura C. Williams (admission pending) in Support of Respondent’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss (dated December 4, 2017) .....	6

---

Upon the foregoing papers, the Verified Petition (001) seeking the modification of the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award to, *inter alia*, restore Petitioner to her position within the Department of Education is granted. This Court denies the cross-motion made by Respondent,

Department of Education (hereinafter “DOE”) seeking the dismissal of Rosalie Cardinale’s verified petition.

## FACTS

The DOE employed Petitioner, Rosalie Cardinale as a special education teacher for 17 years. Petitioner spent the last 15 years of her employment with the DOE at Public School 55 The Henry M. Boehm School (hereinafter “P.S. 55”). Cardinale received satisfactory observations up to the 2013-2014 school year when the DOE adopted the Advance System which uses the Danielson Framework for Teaching. The DOE issued Charges and Specifications (hereinafter “Specifications”) pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a for misconduct during the school years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016, and 2016-2017 through Howard Friedman, General Counsel to the Department of Education by Jessica Wolff-Fordham on February 27, 2017.<sup>1</sup> The caption referenced Rosalie Cardinale, but the body of the Specifications detailed the DOE’s allegations against “Jane Smith.”

The Specifications alleged Petitioner: 1) failed to properly, adequately, and/or effectively plan and/or execute separate lessons, as observed by school administrators on thirteen observation dates, 2) showed a lack of professionalism and poor judgment, 3) neglected her duties, and 4) failed to implement directives and recommendations for improvement.

Petitioner’s counsel sought dismissal of the charges against Cardinale arguing the DOE failed to abide by the statutory framework for the removal of a tenured teacher for cause. Petitioner

---

<sup>1</sup> The Introduction to the “Specifications” reads as follows: “The Board of Education of the City of New York, also known as the New York City Department of Education, brings this action pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a against **Jane Smith** for her failures in the nature of incompetent and inefficient services, misconduct, neglect of duty, and unwillingness and/or inability to follow procedures and carry out normal duties during the 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016, and 2016-2017 school years.” (emphasis added)

argued the DOE failed to conduct an executive meeting of the employing board to find probable cause to conduct a hearing before issuing the Specifications against Petitioner. Hearing Officer Michael A. Lendino rejected Petitioner's motion to dismiss the Section 3020-a Education Law Proceeding. Hearing Office Lendino provided reasoning for his denial in the Opinion and Award where he found the Board of Education Chancellor in the City School District of New York may delegate the authority to conduct an executive meeting by the employing board on probable cause to District Superintendents who may then delegate the same authority to local school principals. Hearing Officer Lendino determined further, without citation to any evidence, that Chancellor Carmen Farina delegated her authority to the District Superintendents who in turn delegated it to local principals.<sup>2</sup>

This Court reviews a record which remains unclear concerning whether the local principal or district superintendent determined probable cause existed justifying the allegations levied against Petitioner to warrant an Education Law § 3020-a hearing. The record, however, makes clear an Education Law § 3020-a proceeding took place on the following dates: April 25 and 26, and May 18, 23, 24, and 31, 2017 before Hearing Officer Lendino.

Hearing Officer Lendino considered testimony given by Petitioner, Principal Sharon Fishman (hereinafter "Fishman"), the principal of P.S. 55, and Assistant Principal Paul Giordano (hereinafter "Giordano"), also from P.S. 55 when he rendered his Opinion and Award. The

---

<sup>2</sup> HO Lendino cited *Pina-Pena v. New York City Dept. of Educ.*, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1630, 2014 NY Slip Op 30893 (U), NY Sup. Ct., Apr. 9, 2014, to demonstrate the delegation of authority from the Chancellor to subordinate employees. The facts of *Pina-Pena*, however, concern a 3020-a Education Law Proceeding taking place in September and November 2012 under former Chancellor Dennis Wolcott not Chancellor Carmen Farina.

testimony given by Fishman and Giordano received additional support from ten informal observation reports and three formal observation reports.<sup>3</sup>

Hearing Officer Lendino issued an Opinion and Award on July 27, 2017. The Opinion and Award contained the following findings relating to Specifications 1 and 4:

**Specification 1:** During the 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years, [Petitioner] failed to properly, adequately and/or effectively plan and/or execute separate lesson[s] as observed on or about each of the following dates:

- a. April 10, 2014;
- b. May 29, 2014;
- c. November 10, 2014;
- d. January 20, 2015
- e. February 25, 2015;
- f. May 18, 2015;
- g. October 8, 2015;
- h. May 11, 2016;
- i. May 26, 2016;
- j. June 1, 2016;
- k. September 27, 2016;
- l. November 16, 2016; and/or
- m. January 17, 2017

**Specification 4:** [Petitioner] failed during the 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016 school years to fully and/or consistently implement directives and/or recommendations for pedagogical improvement and professional development provided in observation conferences with administrators and/or outside observers; instructional meetings; teacher improvement plans; one-on-one meetings with administrators, school-based coaches, and/or outside observers; as well as school-wide professional development with regard to:

- a. Proper planning, pacing, and/or execution of lessons;

---

<sup>3</sup> The combined number of observation minutes over the four school years at issue yielded 362 minutes (6.03 hours) of observation. Of the total 362 minutes observed during four school years, 110 minutes or 1 hour and 40 minutes came through formal observations. The observation report indicates a formal observation involved either Fishman or Giordano observing a full class period. The formal observation reports, however, indicate three different “full period” times of 30 minutes, 35 minutes, and 45 minutes. The formal observation reports also fail to document what constitutes a “period” for students taught by Cardinale in kindergarten through second grade.

- b. Using appropriate methods and/or techniques during lessons;
- c. Designing coherent instruction;
- d. Using assessment in instruction; and/or
- e. Using appropriate questioning and discussion techniques.

Hearing Officer Lendino's Opinion and Award found Cardinale's dismissal from service was an appropriate penalty.

Cardinale commenced this Article 75 proceeding challenging the Opinion and Award dismissing her from service arguing, *inter alia*, significant procedural and substantive deficiencies existed in the hearing process which interferes with the public policy concerning the protection of teachers tenure. Petitioner argues the procedural violations require this Court to restore her status as a DOE employee at P.S. 55.

The DOE cross-moves to dismiss Cardinale's verified petition arguing that it fails to state a cause of action and to confirm the arbitration award under CPLR § 7511(e).

## **DISCUSSION**

### *I. Petitioner Demonstrates Procedural Deficiencies Exist Requiring This Court to Vacate The Arbitration Award for Violation of Strong Public Policy and the Opinion and Award Was Irrational On Its Face*

A court shall vacate an arbitration award when it finds either (1) corruption, fraud, or misconduct, (2) the partiality of an arbitrator, or (3) an award which is made in excess of the arbitrator's enumerated powers prejudiced a party's rights (*see* CPLR 7511 [b] [i]-[iii], *Matter of Meehan v. Nassau Community College*, 242 AD2d 155, 157 (2d Dept 1998)). Court of Appeals case law provides an arbitration award may also be vacated where it is irrational or violative of strong public policy (*see, Town of Callicoon v. Civil Serv. Emples. Ass'n, Inc.*, 70 NY2d 907 [1987], *Matter of United Fedn. Of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. Of City School Dist., of City of N.Y.*, 1 NY3d 72 [2003]).

A. *The Opinion and Award Stripping Petitioner of Tenure and Terminating Her Employment Is Irrational*

The Supreme Court of the United States held the Constitution does not create property rights, “[r]ather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 577 [1972]. New York State created the public school tenure system guaranteeing continued employment to tenured teachers by statute and therefore created a property right in a tenured teacher’s continued employment. (See *Education Law* §§§ 3012, 3012-a, 3020, *Holt v. Board of Educ. of Webutuck Cent. School Dist.*, 52 NY2d 625 [1981], *Matter of Abramvich v. Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Brookhaven & Smithtown*, 46 NY2d 450 [1979]). Where a property right in continued employment exists, such as New York’s tenure system, the recipient of such a right may not be deprived without due process. See *Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532, 538 [1985].

New York State guarantees a tenured teacher’s due process rights to continued employment by statute requiring that “no [tenured teacher] ... shall be disciplined or removed during a term of employment except for just cause and in accordance with the procedures specified in section three thousand twenty-a of this article or in accordance with alternate disciplinary procedures contained in a collective bargaining agreement...” *Education Law* § 3020.

The statutory procedural process afforded to teachers with tenure under *Education Law* § 3020-a requires:

- The filing of charges “in writing and filed with the clerk or secretary for the school district or employing board during the period between the actual opening and closing of the school year for which the employed is normally required to serve. *Education Law* § 3020-a(1)

- “Within five days after receipt of charges, the employing board, in executive session, shall determine, by a vote of a majority of all the members of such board, whether probable cause exists to bring a disciplinary proceeding against the employee pursuant to this section.” *Education Law* § 3020-a(2).
- Where an employing board determines probable cause exists for discipline the tenured teacher shall receive: “a written statement specifying (i) the charges in detail, (ii) the maximum penalty which will be imposed by the board if the employee does not request a hearing or that will be sought by the board if the employee is found guilty of the charges after a hearing and (iii) the employee’s rights under this section, shall be immediately forwarded to the accused employee....” *Id.*

Here, Petitioner’s counsel sought dismissal of the charges against Petitioner at the outset of the hearing. Counsel argued before Hearing Officer Lendino, and now before this Court, that the DOE’s failure to submit the charges against Petitioner to the employing board to determine whether probable cause existed constitutes a procedure defect depriving Hearing Officer Lendino of jurisdiction to consider the charges. Hearing Officer Lendino rejected Petitioner’s argument, but this Court does not.

The argument raised by the DOE opposing Petitioner’s original motion before Hearing Officer Lendino, and again before this Court, insisting the statutory framework does not require probable cause determination by the employing board before an Education Law § 3020-a hearing is unavailing. The DOE reasons the Chancellor wields the statutory power to “exercise all the duties and responsibilities of the employing board... [and] shall exercise all such duties and responsibilities for all community districts or may delegate the exercise of all such duties and

responsibilities to all of the community superintendents...” *Education Law* § 2590-h[38].<sup>4</sup> In turn, the community superintendents may delegate any powers and duties conferred upon them to any subordinates, in this case, local principals. (*See Education Law* § 2590-f[1][b]). The DOE, however, fails to provide this Court with evidence demonstrating the office of the Chancellor delegated any of its duties and responsibilities to the community superintendents. Similarly, the DOE fails to provide any evidence showing a delegation of duties and responsibilities from the community superintendents to the local principals.

The cases cited by the DOE demonstrate a court’s analysis begins with considering evidence indicating the office of the Chancellor transferred responsibilities and duties to subordinate administrators. *See Pina-Pena v. New York City Dept. of Educ.*, 2014 NY Slip Op 30893(U), Sup Ct. NY Cty, Apr. 9, 2014, (finding “the Chancellor [Wolcott] delegated the relevant authority to the District Superintendent who, in turn, delegated her authority to local school principals”); *Matter of Haas v. New York City Bd./Dept. of Educ.*, 35 Misc3d 1207(A), Sup Ct. NY Cty, Apr. 4, 2012 (finding “[o]n August 19, 2002, the chancellor [Klein] delegated ‘to the community school district superintendents the authority to prefer charges against tenured pedagogical employees pursuant to Education [Law] section 3020-1... On August 27, 2007 ... the community superintendent of community school district 29...delegated to each principal of a school within the district the power to ‘[i]nitiate and resolve charges against teaching ... staff members in your school who have completed probation’”); *Matter of Roberts v. Department of Educ. of the City of New York*, 3 NYS3d 287, Sup Ct. NY Cty, Oct. 8, 2014 (finding “On April 19, 2011, Chancellor Dennis M. Walcott delegated...the power to initiate and resolve disciplinary

---

<sup>4</sup> *Education Law* § 2590-h(19) provides additional authority allowing the Chancellor to “[d]elegate any of his or her powers and duties to such subordinate officers or employees as he or she deems appropriate and to modify or rescind any power and duty so delegated.”



charges against teaching and supervisory staff members to community school district superintendents”). There exists no evidence in the record before this Court supporting the transfer of any duties and responsibilities from the office of the Chancellor to any subordinate administrator.<sup>5</sup>

Absent a demonstration by the DOE that the Office of the Chancellor delegated powers to subordinate administrators to unilaterally commence a hearing under *Education Law* § 3020-a Hearing Officer Lendino had any authority to consider the charges levied against Petitioner. Hearing Officer Lendino conducted the *Education Law* § 3020-a hearing based on unproven assumptions that the delegations of duties and responsibilities from the office of the Chancellor to subordinate administrators occurred in compliance with the relevant statutory authority.

Indeed, Respondent fails to counter arguments raised in this Petition and provide evidence, administrative rules, or executive orders, or similar pronouncement of the exercise of executive authority, indicating Chancellor Farina delegated her duties and responsibilities to subordinate administrators. Notwithstanding the low standard needed to demonstrate the rationality of an Opinion and Award, the fact that the Hearing Officer failed to consider a basic jurisdictional predicate before conducting the hearing renders the entire decision irrational because his authority to conduct the hearing is suspect.

*B. The Opinion and Award Violates New York’s Strong Public Policy Protecting Teacher’s Tenure*

The Court of Appeals speaking on the necessity of teacher’s tenure stated:

---

<sup>5</sup> This Court also notes that while the office of the Chancellor may exercise the power of the employing board and delegate the same to subordinate administration officials, it does not appear obligatory. *See Matter of Norgrove v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y.*, 23 Misc3d 684, Sup. Ct. NY Cty., Jan. 13, 2009 [finding in 2007 the Board of Education and not the office of the Chancellor, or its designee, issued a “Notice of Determination of Probable Causes on Charges Brought Against Tenured School District Employee”]

[tenure] is a legislative expression of a firm public policy determination that the interests of the public in the education of our youth can best be served by a system designed to foster academic freedom in our schools and to protect competent teachers from the abuses they might be subjected to if they could be dismissed at the whim of their supervisors. In order to effectuate these convergent purposes, **it is necessary to construe the tenure system broadly in favor of the teacher, and to strictly police procedures which might result in the corruption of that system** by the manipulation of the requirements for tenure...

*Ricca v. Board of Education*, 47 NY2d 385, 391 (1979) (emphasis added). This Court reasons the same strict policing applied to the procedure granting tenure to teachers apply equally to the procedures applied when a school district seeks the removal of a teacher's tenure. (See *Holt v. Board of Ed. of Webutuck Central School Dist.*, 52 NY2d 625, 632 [1981] [finding "[t]he purpose of the statute [*Education Law* § 3020-a] is to protect teachers from arbitrary imposition of formal discipline"'])

Petitioner argues, correctly, the Education Law requires a finding "whether probable cause exists to bring a disciplinary proceeding against an employee" (*Education Law* § 3020-a[2]). There exists no statutory language indicating the statutes permitting the delegation of duties and responsibilities from the employing board to the office of the Chancellor eliminated the precondition of a finding of "probable cause" before subjecting a tenured teacher to the disciplinary hearing anticipated under *Education Law* § 3020-a. Indeed if the DOE properly demonstrated the office of the Chancellor delegated its duties and responsibilities to subordinate administrators, there exists no evidence showing a determination that probable cause existed supporting the allegations against Petitioner.

The DOE's failure to make a finding of probable cause and adhere to the procedural protections guaranteed to Petitioner in *Education Law* § 3020-a violates Petitioner's due process rights and violates New York's strong public policy protecting the integrity of the tenure system.

The hearing conducted before Hearing Officer Lendino, therefore, is a nullity. (*See Sanders v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York*, 17 AD3d 682 [2d Dept 2005], *Morgan v. Board of Educ. of City of New York*, 201 AD2d 482 [2d Dept 1994]).

### **CONCLUSION**

Petitioner demonstrates the Opinion and Award rendered by Hearing Officer Lendino was both irrational and violative of New York's strong public policy protecting the property rights of tenured teachers. The DOE may not abridge the due process protections afforded to tenured teachers for any reason. The DOE's analysis of the law, undeniably, dispenses with the various layers of checks and balances protecting a tenured teacher's Constitutionally protected property right in continued employment and places the decision concerning whether a disciplinary hearing is necessary into the hands of a single administrator. The DOE's suggested framework ignores the various levels of administrative oversight put in place by the legislature to protect tenured teachers. This Court finds such a construction suspect on its face. The DOE, however, failed completely to present evidence or other controlling authority indicating the statutory delegation of duties and responsibilities from the office of the Chancellor to subordinate administrators occurred.

This Court finds the DOE's interpretation of the statutory framework, even had they presented evidence permitting such delegations, runs afoul of the clear legislative intent. The concentration of all disciplinary authority into the hands of a single local administrator creates the very "arbitrary imposition of formal discipline" the legislature sought to prevent when it enacted *Education Law § 3020-a* (*Holt v. Board of Ed. of Webutuck Central School Dist.*, 52 NY2d 625, 632 [1981]).

This Court finds the DOE's interpretation of the statutory framework, even had they presented evidence permitting such delegations, runs afoul of the clear legislative intent contained

in *Education Law* § 3020-a requiring different levels of the education administration apparatus to take part in the decision to discipline a tenured teacher. New York State public policy requires strict compliance with the procedural safeguards afforded to tenured teachers. The DOE's failure to conduct a probable cause analysis deprived Petitioner of her due process rights, thus violating New York's strongly held policy supporting the tenure system.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Rosalie Cardinale's Petition is granted in its entirety; it is further

ORDERED, that the Award and Opinion dated July 27, 2017 is vacated; it is further

ORDERED, that Rosalie Cardinale shall be reinstated effective immediately and entitled to full back pay from the date of termination; it is further

ORDERED, that Respondent's cross-motion is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that Petitioner shall settle judgment.

ENTER,

---

Hon. Desmond Green, J.S.C.

DATED: March \_\_, 2018